[NEW] Lecture on 4 causes | if cause – NATAVIGUIDES

1. Only one of Aristotle’s causes (the “efficient” cause) sounds even remotely
   like a Humean cause.
2. Humean causes are events, and so are their effects, but Aristotle
   doesn’t limit his causes in that way. Typically, it is substances
   that have causes. And that sounds odd.

An is just whatever one can cite in answer to a “why?” question.
And what we give in answering a “why?” question is an explanation. So an
is best thought of as an explanation than as a cause.

Here perhaps Ackrill’s “explanatory factor” is a more illuminating translation of
aition. That is, an aition is something that plays a role as an explanatory
factor in the explanation of something. But, as we’ll see, there are many kinds of explanations.

“that out of which a thing comes-to-be and which persists is said to be a cause, for example, the bronze is a cause of a statue, the silver is a cause of a bowl, and the genera of these [is also a cause].”

“the form or paradigm, and this is the formula of the essence … and the parts that are in the formula.”

The final cause need not be a purpose that someone has in mind.

I.e., where is a biological kind: the of an
is what embryonic, immature, or developing s are all tending to grow
into. The of a developing tiger is to be a tiger.

Thus, for a natural object, the final cause is typically identified
with the formal cause. The final cause of a developing plant or animal
is the form it will ultimately achieve, the form into which it grows
and develops.

References: 198a25, 199a31, 415b10,
715a4ff.

The of a (developing) tiger is just (to be) a tiger (i.e. to
be an animal with the characteristics specified in the definition of a tiger).
Thus, the final cause () and formal cause (essence) amount to the same thing.
And Aristotle also says that a source of natural change (efficient cause) is “a thing’s
form, or what it is, for that is its end and what it is for” (198b3). Hence,
one and the same thing serves as formal, final, and efficient cause.

Claims like “a tiger is for the sake of a tiger” or “an apple tree is for
the sake of an apple tree” sound vacuous. But the identification of formal
with final causes is not vacuous. It is to say, about a developing entity,
that there is something internal to it which will have the result that
the outcome of the sequence of changes it is undergoing —if it runs
true to form —will be another entity of the same kind—a tiger,
or an apple tree.

This can be more easily grasped if we realize that for Aristotle questions
about causes in nature are raised about universals. Hence, the answers
to these questions will also be given in terms of universals. The questions
that ask for formal, final, and efficient causes, respectively, are:

1. What kind of thing do these flesh-and-bones constitute?
2. What has this (seed, embryo, cub) all along been developing into?
3. What produces a tiger?

The answer to all three questions is the same: “a tiger.” It is in this sense
that these three causes coincide.

1. The basic idea (as in all change) is that matter takes on form. The form
   is contributed by the male parent (which actually does have the form), the
   matter by the female parent. This matter has the potentiality to be informed
   by precisely that form.

2. The embryonic substance has the form potentially, and can be “called by the
   same name” as what produces it. (E.g., the embryonic tiger can be called
   a , for that is what it is, potentially at least.) [But there
   are exceptions: the embryonic mule cannot be called by the name of its male
   parent, for that is a (1034b3).]

3. The form does not come into existence. Rather, it must exist beforehand,
   and get imposed on appropriate matter. In the case of the production of
   artifacts, the pre-existing form may exist merely potentially. (E.g., the
   artist has in mind the form he will impose on the clay. Nothing has
   to have the form in actuality.)

4. But in the case of natural generation, the pre-existing form must exist in
   actuality: “there must exist beforehand another actual substance
   which produces it, e.g. an animal must exist beforehand if an animal is produced”
   (1034b17).

We can approach this point by beginning with the case of bodily organs. For
example, the final cause of an eye is its function, namely, sight.
That is what an eye is for.

And this function, according to Aristotle, is part of the formal cause
of the thing, as well. Its function tells us what it is. What it is
to be an eye is to be an organ of sight.

To say what a bodily organ is is to say what it does—what
function it performs. And the function will be one which serves the purpose
of preserving the organism or enabling it to survive and flourish in its
environment.

Since typical, non-defective, specimens of a biological species do survive
and flourish, Aristotle takes it that the function of a kind of animal is
to do what animals of that kind typically do, and as a result of doing
which they survive, flourish, and reproduce.  Cf. Charlton (, p. 102):

. . . the widest or most general kind of thing which all non-defective members
of a class can do, which differentiates them from other members of the next
higher genus, is their function.

1. Only one of Aristotle’s causes (the “efficient” cause) sounds even remotely
   like a Humean cause.
2. Humean causes are events, and so are their effects, but Aristotle
   doesn’t limit his causes in that way. Typically, it is substances
   that have causes. And that sounds odd.

An is just whatever one can cite in answer to a “why?” question.
And what we give in answering a “why?” question is an explanation. So an
is best thought of as an explanation than as a cause.

Here perhaps Ackrill’s “explanatory factor” is a more illuminating translation of
aition. That is, an aition is something that plays a role as an explanatory
factor in the explanation of something. But, as we’ll see, there are many kinds of explanations.

“that out of which a thing comes-to-be and which persists is said to be a cause, for example, the bronze is a cause of a statue, the silver is a cause of a bowl, and the genera of these [is also a cause].”

“the form or paradigm, and this is the formula of the essence … and the parts that are in the formula.”

The final cause need not be a purpose that someone has in mind.

I.e., where is a biological kind: the of an
is what embryonic, immature, or developing s are all tending to grow
into. The of a developing tiger is to be a tiger.

Thus, for a natural object, the final cause is typically identified
with the formal cause. The final cause of a developing plant or animal
is the form it will ultimately achieve, the form into which it grows
and develops.

References: 198a25, 199a31, 415b10,
715a4ff.

The of a (developing) tiger is just (to be) a tiger (i.e. to
be an animal with the characteristics specified in the definition of a tiger).
Thus, the final cause () and formal cause (essence) amount to the same thing.
And Aristotle also says that a source of natural change (efficient cause) is “a thing’s
form, or what it is, for that is its end and what it is for” (198b3). Hence,
one and the same thing serves as formal, final, and efficient cause.

Claims like “a tiger is for the sake of a tiger” or “an apple tree is for
the sake of an apple tree” sound vacuous. But the identification of formal
with final causes is not vacuous. It is to say, about a developing entity,
that there is something internal to it which will have the result that
the outcome of the sequence of changes it is undergoing —if it runs
true to form —will be another entity of the same kind—a tiger,
or an apple tree.

This can be more easily grasped if we realize that for Aristotle questions
about causes in nature are raised about universals. Hence, the answers
to these questions will also be given in terms of universals. The questions
that ask for formal, final, and efficient causes, respectively, are:

1. What kind of thing do these flesh-and-bones constitute?
2. What has this (seed, embryo, cub) all along been developing into?
3. What produces a tiger?

The answer to all three questions is the same: “a tiger.” It is in this sense
that these three causes coincide.

1. The basic idea (as in all change) is that matter takes on form. The form
   is contributed by the male parent (which actually does have the form), the
   matter by the female parent. This matter has the potentiality to be informed
   by precisely that form.

2. The embryonic substance has the form potentially, and can be “called by the
   same name” as what produces it. (E.g., the embryonic tiger can be called
   a , for that is what it is, potentially at least.) [But there
   are exceptions: the embryonic mule cannot be called by the name of its male
   parent, for that is a (1034b3).]

3. The form does not come into existence. Rather, it must exist beforehand,
   and get imposed on appropriate matter. In the case of the production of
   artifacts, the pre-existing form may exist merely potentially. (E.g., the
   artist has in mind the form he will impose on the clay. Nothing has
   to have the form in actuality.)

4. But in the case of natural generation, the pre-existing form must exist in
   actuality: “there must exist beforehand another actual substance
   which produces it, e.g. an animal must exist beforehand if an animal is produced”
   (1034b17).

We can approach this point by beginning with the case of bodily organs. For
example, the final cause of an eye is its function, namely, sight.
That is what an eye is for.

And this function, according to Aristotle, is part of the formal cause
of the thing, as well. Its function tells us what it is. What it is
to be an eye is to be an organ of sight.

To say what a bodily organ is is to say what it does—what
function it performs. And the function will be one which serves the purpose
of preserving the organism or enabling it to survive and flourish in its
environment.

Since typical, non-defective, specimens of a biological species do survive
and flourish, Aristotle takes it that the function of a kind of animal is
to do what animals of that kind typically do, and as a result of doing
which they survive, flourish, and reproduce.  Cf. Charlton (, p. 102):

. . . the widest or most general kind of thing which all non-defective members
of a class can do, which differentiates them from other members of the next
higher genus, is their function.